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THE DISAPPROPRIATION OF FOREIGN




Roberto Chacon de Albuquerque*
I. INTRODUCTIONON May 1, 2006, Bolivia announced a plan to recover its natural
riches through the nationalization of oil and gas. The military
enacted this plan by assuming control of fifty-six oil power
plants. Oil and gas reservoirs, nonetheless, had already been nationalized
a long time ago. According to the Bolivian Constitution, they belonged
to the State. The government signed concession contracts with foreign
companies for the exploration, exploitation, and commercialization of hy-
drocarbons.' By means of international public biddings, foreign compa-
nies were selected to explore oil and gas fields in a contracted area.
Concession contracts did not entail the property transfer of oil and gas
reservoirs. They always continued to belong to the State.
There has not been, therefore, a nationalization of oil and gas, but a
disappropriation 2 of foreign companies that carried out the exploration,
exploitation, and commercialization of hydrocarbons based upon con-
tracts that had been signed with the Bolivian State. Bolivia has always
remained as the proprietor of oil and gas reservoirs in a direct, inaliena-
ble and unrestricted way. One of the key problems in the disappropria-
tion of foreign companies is the legal insecurity that it causes. It may
contradict what was agreed on in treaties, as well as what was laid down
by highly-regarded decisions of international courts. Disappropriation
does not occur solely through the confiscation of assets belonging to com-
*Lawyer, Doctor in Law from the University of Sdo Paulo, Professor of Interna-
tional Law at the Catholic University of Brasflia
1. "Hydrocarbon" is a term that is usually applied in Bolivia to designate gas and oil.
Technically speaking, hydrocarbon is a chemical compound formed by carbon and
hydrogen. Natural gas is a gas hydrocarbon, while oil is a liquid hydrocarbon.
2. This article considers the scenario of the government disappropriating facilities
belonging to foreign companies involved in the exploration, exploitation and com-
mercialization of hydrocarbons in Bolivia. Disappropriation differs from an ex-
propriation in the strict sense; an expropriation would imply a priori the refusal to
pay any compensation to those who might be affected by a measure of such nature.
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panies, but also with the adoption of abusive and discriminatory taxes
that render the companies' activities unviable. Even with the goal of the
autonomous industrialization of oil and gas, disappropriation affects com-
pensation for the foreign companies involved. Every instance of disap-
propriation results primarily from a political decision. It requires genuine
social support and awareness of its necessities, implications, and
repercussions.
Profits from oil and gas exploration may be defined as the difference
between the market price, the production costs of transportation,
processing and distribution, and the return for the invested capital. When
oil and gas prices rise, the position of states with hydrocarbons is
strengthened with regard to demanding increased participation in the
profits of the exploration of their reservoirs. Joint-venture contracts 3 be-
tween foreign companies and the respective State-owned oil and gas com-
pany may be revised; new taxes may be adopted; and royalties, the share
of the profit that is reserved by the concessionary, may be increased. In
extreme cases, the disappropriation of foreign companies that explore hy-
drocarbons may occur. The situation reverses when oil and gas prices
fall. The negotiation power of foreign companies is strengthened because
many hydrocarbon-producing countries begin to compete for their invest-
ments. Revenue appropriation levels by the State, government take,4 by
means of taxes and royalties are decisive factors in choosing where to
invest. Bolivia has followed this dynamic in a consistent way. When oil
and gas prices go down, concession contracts are negotiated in a way
favorable to foreign companies. As oil and gas prices go up, the State
adopts measures that systematically increase revenue appropriation
levels.
The oil and gas nationalization announced by Bolivia on May 1, 2006,
could have been focused on specific elements that might have legitimized
the nationalization both at home and abroad. First, untapped reservoirs
could have been recovered under provisions of the contracts with the for-
eign companies. Second, contracts with foreign companies could have
been revised or rescinded if the companies had not carried out their in-
vestment engagements. In both cases, however, contractual clauses
would not have been implemented by foreign companies.
Bolivia adopted a different strategy. Oil and gas reservoirs, according
to the Constitution, already belonged to the State. It was not considered
enough to revise or rescind joint venture contracts with foreign compa-
3. According to article 1.1 of the Hydrocarbons Act 1689, of April 30, 1996, joint-
venture contracts, in the context of concession contracts, should be signed for the
exploration, exploitation, and commercialization of gas and oil. Ley de Hidro-
carburos, Ley N' 1689, 30 de Abril de 1996, Gaceta N' 1933 (Bol.) [hereinafter
Hydrocarbons Act 1689].
4. The expression "government take," in this text, basically means the revenue frac-
tion of the private companies involved in the exploration, exploitation, and com-
mercialization of hydrocarbons that is appropriated by the State through taxes and
royalties.
HYDROCARBONS IN BOLIVIA
nies. Yacimientos Petrolfferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB), the Bolivian
oil and gas State-owned company, is a de-capitalized company, meaning
it is unable to finance its activities and lacks the personnel to guarantee
production continuity. 5 The government's goal was to capitalize YPFB so
that it would centralize the exploration, exploitation, and commercializa-
tion of hydrocarbons. In order to capitalize YPFB, it would be necessary
to de-capitalize foreign companies operating in Bolivia, by disappropriat-
ing them.
In the previous years, the Bolivian State had already increasingly ap-
propriated revenue earned by foreign companies through their explora-
tion, exploitation, and commercialization of hydrocarbons. The new
Hydrocarbons Act 3058, of May 17, 2005, raised the government's share
from 18 percent to 50 percent.6 From May 1, 2006, the government share,
at least in the most productive fields, such as those belonging to Pe-
trobras, had risen to 82 percent. 7 In 1996, Petrobras settled in Bolivia
under an agreement between Bolivia and Brazil. This agreement allowed
the exploration, exploitation, and commercialization of Bolivian natural
gas reserves.
The disappropriation of foreign companies has as its goal endowing
YPFB with capital that will enable it to continually invest in the explora-
tion, exploitation, and commercialization of hydrocarbons, with or with-
out the participation of foreign companies. If YPFB's capitalization
process, based on the de-capitalization of foreign companies, does not
succeed, the indicators of oil and gas production in Bolivia will start to
fall, damaging the country's economy. The rise in the government's share
from 18 percent to 82 percent indicates that the Bolivian State needs to
increasingly appropriate higher percentages of revenue, thereby discour-
aging foreign investment, in order to transfer resources to YPFB with the
objective of granting it the means to take absolute control over hydrocar-
bons. In its long history of oil and gas nationalization, the Bolivian gov-
ernment has swung from one extreme to another like a pendulum.
II. HISTORIC MODELS OF OIL AND
GAS NATIONALIZATION
There are basically three extreme models of appropriation of the reve-
nue earned by the exploration, exploitation, and commercialization of hy-
drocarbons. First, the State monopolizes the activity and thoroughly
appropriates the revenue by means of a State-owned company. Second,
the State allows private companies to coexist with a State-owned com-
pany. The State appropriates part of the revenue of the private compa-
5. YPFB was created on December 21, 1936, during Colonel David Toro's
government.
6. Ley N' 3058, Ley N' de Hidurocarburos, art. 55.3, de 17 de Mayo 2005, Gaceta N0
2749 (Bol.) [hereinafter Hydrocarbons Act 3058].
7. Decreto Nacionalizaci6n de Hidrocarburos en Bolivia, Decreto Supremo 28701,
"Hdroes del Chaco," art. 4.1, May 1, 2006 (Bol.) [hereinafter Supreme Decree
28701].
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nies through taxes and royalties. Third, the State also appropriates part
of the revenue earned through the exploration, exploitation, and com-
mercialization of hydrocarbons through taxes and royalties that are paid
by private companies. But the third model differs from the second model
because, unlike in the second model, the activity is not shared by a State-
owned company and private companies. In the third model, only private
companies explore the sector. Saudi Arabia and Iran, for instance, fit in
the first model. Bolivia fits into the second model. The United States is
an example of the third model, for the United States has never had an oil
State-owned company. 8
Nationalization may mean reversing property rights to the State's ben-
efit and awarding, as compensation, an indemnity to the disappropriated
companies. The State has eminent control over persons situated within
the State territory and, indirectly, over their property. By declaring it as
"public use," the State may nationalize an activity that was previously
owned, controlled, and managed by the private sector. Public authorities
traditionally disappropriate private property so as to, for example, build
roads, dams, and public buildings. The concept of nationalization none-
theless expanded during the twentieth century, by differentiating itself
from disappropriation. Nationalization means disappropriation in order
to promote justice and equality, taking into account social and economic
considerations, among the various countries in the international commu-
nity. Eastern Europe's formerly communist countries nationalized nearly
their whole industrial and agricultural sector during the period that fol-
lowed the Second World War. During the labor government from 1945 to
1951, the United Kingdom nationalized a number of sectors, including
that of coal mining. In many non-communist countries, it became com-
monplace to indemnify owners for what the State had disappropriated.
In the previously communist countries, where private property of the pro-
duction means as a principle was not allowed, indemnification was usually
not awarded. 9
The disappropriation of foreign companies usually occurs in developing
countries, where there is strong resentment towards the internationaliza-
tion of key economic sectors. In 1938, Mexico nationalized its oil sector,
which was controlled by American companies. In 1951, Iran disap-
propriated the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company; and Egypt disappropriated
the Suez Canal Company in 1956. In addition, Chile disappropriated the
copper mining industry, which was controlled by foreign companies in
1971. Such disappropriations give birth to complex international public
8. Brazil, with Petrobras as a State-owned company, has recently abandoned one
model-a model of total monopoly in which Petrobras was an excluding agent-in
favor of a model where the coexistence of a State-owned company and private
companies in the exploration, exploitation, and commercialization of hydrocar-
bons is the norm.
9. In a broader sense, "to nationalize" means to convert a foreign property into a
national property. Nationalization then gets a social and economic projection that
may give it a new meaning. It is the State policy that excludes foreign companies
from specific economic sectors.
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legal issues. In some cases, the problem is solved by granting indemnifi-
cation to the disappropriated parties. In other instances, when the rem-
edy of indemnification is not available, there may be a weakening in the
international relations between the involved countries. Some developing
countries affirm that the concession granted to a foreign company is not
an international agreement because it is subject to the conceding State's
national law. Consequently, foreign countries have to face the challenges
of disappropriation.
Bolivia has previously twice adopted oil and gas nationalization plans
that involved the disappropriation of foreign companies. The first adop-
tion occurred in 1937, under the government of Colonel David Toro. The
second occurred in 1969, when the country was ruled by General Alfredo
Ovando. The first nationalization had a revanchist motivation. Standard
Oil would have acted against Bolivian interests during the Chaco War, in
which Bolivia lost a significant part of its territory to Paraguay. 10 Stan-
dard Oil would have resisted selling oil to the Bolivian Army, as well as
would have been involved in the underground oil export to Argentina
and Paraguay. Suspicions like these, and of tax evasion, would have led
to its disappropriation on March 13, 1937, followed by the payment of an
indemnification. This was the first nationalization suffered by Standard
Oil, then the world's most important oil company. This nationalization
caused the international financial market to become unfriendly towards
Bolivia. YPFB, the Bolivian hydrocarbons State-owned company, did
not have resources to invest in order to increase oil and gas production.
The second disappropriation of foreign companies occurred during the
Oil Code of 1956, which intended to create conditions to attract invest-
ments. It brought many foreign companies to the country. The most suc-
cessful was Gulf Oil Company. In 1968, General Ren6 Barrientos
suspended the Oil Code's validity. Conditions later emerged for General
Alfredo Ovando to disappropriate Gulf Oil Company, once again fol-
lowed by the payment of an indemnification. Both YPFB and the Boliv-
ian government benefited from this initiative at first. The complete
recovery of oil and gas was initially successful because of the increase in
the hydrocarbons price. After the disappropriation of October 17, 1969,
the financial market once again turned on Bolivia. From 1973 on, with
the first oil shock, the price of oil rose, increasing Bolivia's export reve-
nue source.
There is no consensus on what Bolivia actually achieved economically
from the 1937 and 1969 disappropriations. After these events, the devel-
opment, growth, and expansion of the Bolivian oil industry slowed for
decades. Since the beginning of the 1970's, it was a commonplace view
that it would be necessary to industrialize natural gas in Bolivian terri-
10. The Chaco War is known in Bolivia as the "Oil War". There were suspicions that
in the Chaco, a region that is close to Mato Grosso do Sul, a Brazilian state, and
that until then belonged to Bolivia, there would be oil reservoirs, a suspicion that
later proved to be unfounded.
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tory. But YPFB did not have the means to continue this project. Today,
there are no guarantees that YPFB will be able to industrialize natural
gas in Bolivia, and a lack of resources is not the only reason. The com-
plete recovery of oil and gas may be a pretext to facilitate an increase in
YPFB's bureaucratic structure.
The main entities that supported the last disappropriation of foreign
companies, which occurred on May 1, 2006, were the Bolivian Labor
Confederation (COB)" and the National Heritage Defense Committee
(Codepanal). 12 The nationalization model adopted continues to embrace
the sharing of the activity of exploration, exploitation, and commerciali-
zation of hydrocarbons between a State-owned company and foreign
companies as the State appropriates part of the revenue of the latter
through taxes and royalties. But the government share, the part of the
revenue that is appropriated by the Bolivian State, has grown. The ad-
justment of the tax and royalties system proposed by COB and
Codepanal planned to increase the government share to at least 50
percent.13
On May 1, 2006, Bolivia conducted the military occupation of the refin-
eries that were mainly operated by Petrobras, who did not have the op-
portunity to assimilate the disappropriation decree. First, the fields were
occupied manu militare so that in the following 180 days, new contracts
would be negotiated with foreign companies. 14 In light of what happened
in the past, Bolivia adopted such measures stimulated by the increase in
oil and gas prices on the international market. It is in the Andean Region
where the consensus concerning the complete recovery of hydrocarbons
has been consolidated as a means to increase the State's revenues. 15 Bra-
zil was one of the major investors in the Bolivian energy sector, and its
main natural gas buyer. It was the country most seriously hit by the
adopted measures. Petrobras was one of the few foreign companies to
feel the impact of the Bolivian decision, besides Spain's Repsol and
France's Total.
The military occupation of May 1, 2006, of the refineries is not an iso-
lated event in Bolivia's recent history. The water supply system in Bolivia
was de-privatized as a consequence of popular uprisings, known collec-
tively as the Water War, which occurred in April 2000 in the city of Co-
chabamba. Later, in October 2003, Bolivia was once again disrupted by
another popular uprising, the Gas War, in which social, political, labor,
civic, and neighborhood organizations demanded the complete recovery
of hydrocarbons. The mobilization tactics consisted of mass protests,
11. Central Obrera Boliviana (COB).
12. Comit6 de Defensa del Patrimonio Nacional (Codepanal).
13. As we have already had the opportunity to highlight before, beginning on May 1,
2006, the government take has reached up to 82 percent, well above what had been
initially proposed by COB and Codepanal.
14. Supreme Decree 28701, art. 3.1.
15. In Ecuador and Venezuela, measures that increase each State's participation in the
profits with oil exports have been recently adopted.
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road blockages, and the besiegement of towns and cities. On October 17,
2003, then-president Gonzalo SAnchez de Lozada, who did not support
the complete recovery of hydrocarbons, with the massive appropriation
of the foreign companies' revenue, through an increase of taxes and roy-
alties, resigned for the benefit of his vice-president, Carlos Mesa.16
III. LEGAL MECHANISMS FOR OIL
AND GAS NATIONALIZATION
Different legal mechanisms may be used for oil and gas nationalization.
Various alternatives were analyzed by the Bolivian government before
May 1, 2006. This section discusses the main legal mechanisms that were
created to implement the complete recovery of hydrocarbons.
The first alternative that was considered was the disappropriation for
public use. Although this has been considered sound from a legal angle,
it was not considered convenient from a political viewpoint. Disap-
propriation for public use mandates the need to indemnify, calculated ac-
cording to the actual loss and the loss of profits suffered by the
disappropriated company. This legal mechanism was determined to be
too complex and costly for Bolivia. Thus, a complete-recovery legal
mechanism should be considered for hydrocarbons that would imply the
least possible amount of indemnification. The path to be followed for the
complete recovery of hydrocarbons would then be circumscribed to Bo-
livian contract law. By transferring to the foreign companies the duty to
fulfill the contract clauses, the State's good faith would not be affected.
Bolivia would then not need to indemnify foreign companies, since it
would only need to compensate them for investments made in the coun-
try after enabling audit.17
The second alternative that was envisaged by the Bolivian government
was the contracts' rescission or cessation. The first step would be a legal
and financial audit to assess the validity and fulfillment of contractual
clauses. It would determine the foreseen investment amount in the con-
tractual clauses and the investment amount actually executed by foreign
companies for oil and gas exploration, exploitation, and commercializa-
tion projects. Most companies would not have executed investments
foreseen in the contractual clauses. Foreign companies would then be
sued for the contracts' rescission or cessation.18 Not only were there ar-
guments that the contractually foreseen investment amount had not been
16. With the "complete recovery" of hydrocarbons, the Bolivian government intended
to solve the country's social and economic problems. The creation of a new model
of economic development would only be possible if it integrally met the needs of
all Bolivians, which would only be possible if the State retains absolute control of
its resources.
17. In order to disappropriate foreign companies, 51 percent of their shares were con-
fiscated, so that the State would be able to participate in the companies' decisions,
businesses, and profits. Supreme Decree 28701, art. 7.2. This alternative was con-
sidered to be less drastic that the 100 percent confiscation of their shares, mostly
due to the possible impact resulting from the respective indemnification.
18. CODIGO CIVIL [C.C.], art. 568:
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executed, but also that foreign companies manipulated accounting docu-
ments, as well as production and commercialization data, thereby de-
frauding the State. The Supreme Court of Justice 19 itself would be
competent to try the lawsuit concerning the contracts' rescission or cessa-
tion in the light of what is foreseen in article 775 of the Bolivian Civil
Procedure Code 20 and in article 118.1. of the Bolivian Constitution.21
Contracts for the exploration, exploitation, and commercialization of oil
and gas had been signed in the light of Hydrocarbons Act 1689, of April
30, 1996. Its article 30.1 stated that foreign companies should drill an oil
well in each plot that was allocated to them. Companies which had
around four to six plots later had the duty to drill around four to six wells.
Some drilled no more than two wells. If, after five years of the granting
of the concession, foreign companies had not built the stipulated amount
of wells, the plots would automatically revert to the State.22
As a third alternative, the nullification of the contracts was consid-
ered.23 Its goal would be to invalidate the contracts signed with foreign
companies for the exploration, exploitation, and commercialization of hy-
drocarbons, as well as its legal effects. The respective lawsuit would be
tried when contractual clauses go against constitutional tenets. Contracts
lEn los contratos con prestaciones recfprocas cuando una de las partes
incumple por su voluntad la obligaci6n, la parte que ha cumplido puede
pedir judicialmente el cumplimiento o la resoluci6n del contrato, ms el
resarcimiento del dafilo; o tambidn puede pedir s6lo el cumplimiento den-
tro de un plazo razonable que fijarA el juez, y no haci6ndose efectiva la
prestaci6n dentro de ese plazo quedarA resuelto el contrato, sin perjuicio,
en todo caso, de resarcir el daflo. (Arts. 344, 520, 596 del C6digo Civil).
IISi se hubiera demandado solamente la resoluci6n, no podri ya pedirse
el cumplimiento del contrato; y el demandado, a su vez, ya no podrd
cumplir su obligaci6n desde el dia de su notificaci6n con la demanda.
19. The Supreme Court of Justice is the paramount organ of the Bolivian Judiciary
Power.
20. "En todos los casos en que existiere contenci6n emergente de los contratos,
negociaciones o concesiones del Poder Ejecutivo, conforme a las previsiones per-
tinentes de la Constituci6n Polftica del Estado, se presentard la demanda ante la
Corte Suprema de Justicia con los requisitos sefialados en el artfculo 327."
CODIGO DE PROCEDIMIENTO CIVIL [CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE] art. 775(Bol.).
21. "Son atribuciones de la Corte Suprema: 7 - Conocer y resolver causas y recursos
en materia contencioso-administrativa, conforme a ley." CONSTITUCION POLTICA
DE LA REPOBLICA DE BOLIVIA art. 118.1.
22. Hydrocarbons Act 1689, art. 30.1:
El Area de explotaci6n seleccionada dentro del Area del contrato por
cada descubrimiento comercial, tendrd una superficie mxima de diez
parcelas. En cualquier caso, si en el plazo de cinco afios desde la notifica-
ci6n a YPFB y a la Secretarfa Nacional de Energfa con la declaratoria de
un descubrimiento comercial, el interesado no hubiese efectuado la
perforaci6n de al menos un pozo productor o de inyecci6n en cada una
de las parcelas seleccionadas, 6stas serdn obligatoriamente devueltas.
23. CODIGO CIVIL art. 549 (Bol.):
El contrato seri nulo: 1) Por faltar en el contrato, el objeto o la forma
prevista por la ley como requisito de validez. 2) Por faltar en el objeto del
contrato los requisitos seflalados por la ley. 3) Por ilicitud de la causa y
por ilicitud del motivo que impuls6 a las partes a celebrar el contrato. 4)
Por error esencial sobre la naturaleza o sobre el objeto del contrato. 5)
En los demds casos determinados por ia ley.
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would de facto transfer oil and gas ownership to foreign companies, con-
trary to the provisions in article 139 of the Bolivian Constitution.24 An-
other example of contradiction between contractual clauses and
constitutional tenets is that the contracts contemplated controversy reso-
lution by foreign courts, thereby disregarding article 135 of the Bolivian
Constitution: "All companies that were established to explore, take bene-
fit or make business in the country shall be considered nationals and be
submitted to the sovereignty, to the laws and authorities of the Repub-
lic."'25 Lack of formal requirements would also motivate the contracts'
nullification. Contracts signed with foreign companies for the explora-
tion, exploitation, and commercialization of hydrocarbons would not
have been submitted to the legislative power's approval, violating article
59.5 of the Bolivian Constitution.26 The lawsuit for contract nullification
does not expire.27
IV. BOLIVIAN CONSTITUTION
For a long time, the Bolivian Constitution has assured that the State is
the owner of its oil and gas reservoirs in a "direct, inalienable, and un-
prescriptable" way. Oil and natural gas were not nationalized on May 1,
2006; on this date, there was only the disappropriation of foreign compa-
nies involved in the exploration, exploitation, and commercialization of
oil and gas.
The third part of the Bolivian Constitution is called "Special Re-
gimes." 28 Its first title refers to the "Economic and Financial Regime." 29
The first title is divided into two chapters: the first, "General Disposi-
tions," 30 and the second, "National Goods. '31
Article 133 of the Bolivian Constitution determines the country's eco-
nomic purpose: "The economic regime shall favor the strengthening of
the national independence and the country's development through the
defense and the use of natural and human resources in the protection of
the State's security and in the search of the Bolivian people's well-be-
24. CONSTITUCION POLITICA art. 139:
Los yacimientos de hidrocarburos, cualquiera que sea el estado en que se
encuentren o la forma en que se presenten, son del dominio directo, ina-
lienable e imprescriptible del Estado. Ninguna concesi6n o contrato
podrd conferir la propiedad de los yacimientos de hidrocarburos. La ex-
ploraci6n, explotaci6n, comercializaci6n y transporte de los hidro-
carburos y sus derivados, corresponden al Estado. Este derecho lo
ejerceri mediante entidades autArquicas o a travds de concesiones y con-
tratos por tiempo limitado, a sociedades mixtas de operaci6n conjunta o
a personas privadas, conforme a ley.
25. Id. art. 135.
26. Id. art. 59: "Son atribuciones del Poder Legislativo ... 5: Autorizar y aprobar la
contrataci6n de emprdstitos que comprometan las rentas generales del Estado, asf
como los contratos relativos a la explotaci6n de las riquezas nacionales."
27. CODIGO CIVIL art. 552: "La accci6n de nulidad es imprescriptible."
28. CONSTITUCION POLTICA, Third Part, Regimenes Especiales.
29. Id., Third Part, First Title, Regfmen Econ6mico y Financiero.
30. Id., Third Part, First Title, Chapter I, Disposiciones Generales.
31. Id., Third Part, First Title, Chapter II, Bienes Nacionales.
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ing."'32 Article 134 forbids the private accumulation of economic power
and monopoly:
It shall not be allowed the private accumulation of economic power
in such a degree that the State's economic independence be put in
danger. No kind of private monopoly is recognized. Public services
concessions, when they are exceptionally made, shall not be awarded
for a period longer than forty years. 33
Article 136 notes that national goods belong to the State's proprietary
domain:
1. Besides the goods to which the law confers this quality, the ground
and the underground with all its natural riches, the lake, river and
medicinal waters, as well as the elements and physical forces suitable
for use belong to the State's proprietary domain. 2. The law shall set
up the conditions of this domain, as well as of its concession and
adjudication to private parties.34
National goods, under article 137, constitute public property: "The Na-
tion's heritage goods constitute public property, inviolable, having every
national territory's inhabitant the duty to respect and protect it.''35 Arti-
cle 139 states that the Bolivian State is the owner of its oil and gas reser-
voirs, in a direct, inalienable and unprescriptable way:
Hydrocarbons reservoirs, no matter the state in which they are or the
form in which they are presented, belong to the direct, inalienable
and unprescriptable State's domain. No concession or contract shall
confer the ownership over hydrocarbons reservoirs. Exploration, ex-
ploitation, commercialization and transportation of hydrocarbons
and its by-products belong to the State. This right shall be exerted
by means of autarchic entities or through concessions and contracts
for a limited period, to mixed societies of joint operation or to pri-
vate parties, according to the law. 36
By increasing the government share through the adjustment of the tax
and royalties system, Bolivia, from May 1, 2006 onwards, disappropriated
the revenue earned by foreign companies through their exploration, ex-
ploitation, and commercialization of oil and gas, in what can be consid-
ered an indication that they, just like the mining groups, may in the future
have their assets completely transferred to the government. The Bolivian
Constitution, article 138, indicates that the nationalized mining sector be-
longs to the nation's patrimony:
The nationalized mining groups belong to the Nation's patrimony as
one of the bases for the development and diversification of the coun-
try's economy, and they cannot be transferred or adjudicated in
property to private companies with any purpose. The upper direction
32. Id. art. 133 (translated by author).
33. Id. art. 134 (translated by author).
34. Id. art. 136 (translated by author).
35. Id. art. 137 (translated by author).
36. Id. art. 139 (translated by author).
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and management of the state mining industry shall be in charge of an
autarchic entity with the attributions determined by the law. 37
V. REFERENDUM ON HYDROCARBONS
In October 2003, Bolivia experienced a serious political crisis, the so-
called "Gas War." Social protests paralyzed the country, causing dozens
of deaths and injuries. Peasant and labor organizations built a front
against former President Gonzalo SAnchez de Lozada, asking for his res-
ignation. They demanded the convocation of a constituent assembly, the
holding of a referendum on the "complete recovery" of hydrocarbons
and the non-export of natural gas to Chile.3 8 On October 17, 2003, for-
mer President Gonzalo Sinchez de Lozada resigned. Vice-President Car-
los Mesa took over the presidency after the Bolivian Congress accepted
him as the constitutional successor.
President Mesa shortly thereafter announced a referendum that since
the beginning was paradoxically considered as having an antidemocratic
nature by peasant and labor organizations. Its purpose would not be to
pay attention to the demands of large sectors of the Bolivian population,
but rather to legitimize the approval of a new Hydrocarbons Act 39 that
would not be different at all from the Hydrocarbons Act already in
force. 40 The referendum's result would be indifferent. It would end up
legitimizing Gonzalo Sdinchez de Lozada's previous policy on hydrocar-
bons, which was favorable to foreign companies. Popular demands from
the October 2003 uprising basically comprised the following: the "com-
plete recovery" of hydrocarbons; the strengthening of YPFB as a State-
owned company that should participate in the exploration, exploitation,
and commercialization process of hydrocarbons; and the increase in the
government share to at least 50 percent. 41 President Mesa was accused of
using the referendum to legitimize the foreign companies that had signed
contracts with the Bolivian government for the buying and selling of oil
and gas.42
37. Id. art. 138 (translated by author).
38. In the Pacific War, which occurred between 1879 and 1883, Chile defeated the
alliance formed by Bolivia and Peru. Bolivians lost their access to the sea. This
provoked a strong popular resentment against Chile in Bolivia up to the present
time, leading its population to systematically reject, for instance, the natural gas
export to that country.
39. The new Hydrocarbons Act was approved on May 17, 2005, at the very end of
Carlos Mesa's government. See Hydrocarbons Act 3058.
40. The Hydrocarbons Act then in force against which the Bolivian population had
massively protested against was the Hydrocarbons Act 1689, of April 30, 1996. It
had been approved during Gonzalo SAnchez de Lozada's government, and was
considered favorable towards the interests of foreign companies.
41. It was also intended to forbid gas exports to Chile and to industrialize hydrocar-
bons within the Bolivian territory.
42. If majority voted "yes" on the referendum, the people would legitimize the new
Hydrocarbons Act proposed by Carlos Mesa, which would leave entrenched the
policy of the former Hydrocarbons Act. This new Act did not contemplate the
"complete recovery" of gas and oil. If the "no" votes prevailed, the former Hydro-
carbons Act would be legitimized. The referendum's questions would circum-
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President Mesa went forward, meeting the demands of peasant and la-
bor organizations by promising: 1) to establish a constituent assembly; 2)
to hold a binding referendum on natural gas; and 3) to reformulate the
Hydrocarbons Act 1689, of April 30, 1996, then in force.43 The Bolivian
Constitution, article 4.1, states: "The people deliberate and govern by
means of its representatives and through the citizen's legislative initiative
and the constitutional referendum, established by this Constitution and
normalized by law." 44 Gonzalo Sinchez de Lozada had intended to hold
a referendum in order to decide the hydrocarbons' fate. President Mesa,
on the contrary, had promised to hold a binding referendum. The refer-
endum's results would determine his policies regarding oil and gas.45
President Mesa scheduled the binding referendum for July 18, 2004, but
did not submit the Hydrocarbons Bill of Law that had been presented to
the National Congress for popular approval.46 The COB protested
against the referendum, since its proposals did not contemplate the "com-
plete recovery" of hydrocarbons. Mesa did not favor the disappropria-
tion of foreign companies. 47
The five questions of the July 18, 2004 referendum were as follows: 48
1. Do you agree that the Hydrocarbons Act 1689, enacted by
Gonzalo Sdnchez de Lozada, should be repealed? Yes or No.
49
scribe the people's decision between two options that in the end were exactly the
same.
43. Former President Carlos Mesa had to face a coalition of civic committees from the
provinces of Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando, and Tarija. Santa Cruz, Beni and Pando are
provinces situated in Bolivia's eastern region, close to Brazil. These three prov-
inces are Bolivia's farmland, with fertile and well-cultivated lands. Tarija, a prov-
ince in Bolivia's southern region, close to Argentina, has the country's largest
natural gas reservoirs. Historically, Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando, and Tarija have de-
manded more decentralization and autonomy from La Paz's central government.
In extreme cases, they have demanded their own independence.
44. CONSTITUCION POLMTICA art. 4.1 (translated by author).
45. Members of the Civic Committee of Tarija argued that 85 percent of the country's
oil and gas reserves are situated in this province, which has a small electoral col-
lege, i.e., only 4.85 percent of the whole electorate. The decision about what to do
with oil and gas resources fell into the hands of the hydrocarbon-consuming prov-
inces, contrary to the non-industrialized gas export, and not into those of the pro-
ducing provinces.
46. Social sectors argued that the referendum was unconstitutional. The referendum
would need a specific act that would authorize its holding. It was approved by
means of a presidential decree.
47. The Movement Towards Socialism (MAS), whose leader is currently President
Evo Morales, undertook a campaign promoting "yes" votes for the referendum's
first three questions and "no" votes for the two remaining questions.
48. Three arguments were used under a technical and legal standpoint against the ref-
erendum: lack of legality, lack of consistency in each question, and complexity of
the questions and the language used in the questions.
49. "1 iEstd usted de acuerdo con la abrogaci6n de la Ley de Hidrocarburos 1689
promulgada por Gonzalo SAnchez de Lozada? Sf o No." Referdndum 2004 (voted
on July 18, 2004), question 1 (translated by author) [hereinafter Referdndum
2004].
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2. Do you agree that the Bolivian State should recover ownership
over all hydrocarbons at the wellhead? 50
3. Do you agree that [YPFB] should be re-established, reclaiming
State ownership of the Bolivian people's stakes in the capitalized oil
companies, so that it can take part in all stages of the hydrocarbon
production chain?51
4. Do you agree with President Carlos Mesa's policy of using gas as
a strategic recourse to achieve a sovereign and viable route of access
to the Pacific Ocean? 52
5. Do you agree that Bolivia should export gas as part of a national
policy framework that ensures the gas needs of Bolivians; encourages
the industrialization of gas in the nation's territory; levies taxes and/
or royalties of up to 50 percent of the production value of oil and gas
on oil companies, for the nation's benefit; and earmarks revenues
from the export and industrialization of gas mainly for education,
health, roads, and jobs?53
We are now going to analyze the scope of each question.
A. QUESTION 1. "Do YOU AGREE THAT THE HYDROCARBONS ACT
1689, ENACTED BY GONZALO SANCHEZ DE LOZADA,
SHOULD BE REPEALED? YES OR No."
One of the October 2003 protests' demands was that the Hydrocarbons
Act 1689, of April 30, 1996, be repealed. Its repeal would entail the nulli-
fication of the contracts that had been signed within its framework. For-
mer President Mesa had declared that the repeal of the Hydrocarbons
Act 1689 would not imply the nullification of shared-risk contracts 54 with
oil companies, signed under the protection of this Act. The Act would be
repealed, but the contracts would remain in force until their expiration
date.
50. ",Estd usted de acuerdo con la recuperaci6n de la propiedad de todos los hidro-
carburos en boca de pozo para el Estado boliviano?" Id., question 2. "Boca de
Pozo: Es el punto de salida de la corriente total de fluidos que produce un pozo
(Petr6leo, Gas Natural, Agua de Formaci6n y Sedimentos), antes de ser con-
ducidos a un Sistema de Adecuaci6n." Hydrocarbons Act 3058, art. 138.
51. ",Estd usted de acuerdo con refundar Yacimientos Petrolfferos Fiscales Bolivia-
nos, recuperando la propiedad estatal de las acciones de las bolivianas y los bolivi-
anos en las empresas petroleras capitalizadas, de manera que pueda participar en
toda la cadena productiva de los hidrocarburos?" Referendum 2004, question 3,
supra note 49.
52. ",EstA usted de acuerdo con la polftica del presidente Carlos Mesa de utilizar el
gas como recurso estratdgico para el logro de una salida titil y soberana al Oc6ano
Pacifico?" Id., question 4.
53. Id., question 5 (translated by author).
LEsti usted de acuerdo con que Bolivia exporte gas en el marco de una
polftica nacional que cubra el consumo de gas de las bolivianas y los
bolivianos, fomente la industrializaci6n del gas en territorio nacional,
cobre impuestos y/o regalfas a las empresas petroleras Ilegando al 50 por
ciento del valor de la producci6n del gas y el petr6leo en favor del pas;
destine los recursos de la exportaci6n e industrializaci6n del gas,
principalmente para educaci6n, salud, caminos y empleos? Id.
54. The original Spanish expression used in Bolivian law is "contratos de riesgo
compartido."
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This question has a mostly generalist approach. It would convey the
impression that the repeal of the Hydrocarbons Act 1689, of April 30,
1996, would allow for the "complete recovery" of hydrocarbons, with the
nullification of the respective contracts. The "yes" answer to the repeal
of the Hydrocarbons Act 1689 would give a carte blanche for Mesa's gov-
ernment to adopt a new hydrocarbons act without the need of public ap-
proval. The new Hydrocarbons Act 3058, of May 17, 2005, as a matter of
fact was not submitted to public approval. With the favorable response to
the July 18, 2004, Referendum, Mesa obtained a tacit approval to his own
bill. The new Hydrocarbons Act was seen as too moderate by segments
of the Bolivian population. Public mobilizations returned, and President
Mesa's government ended up being overthrown in the same way as
Gonzalo Sinchez de Lozada's had been.
B. QUESTION 2. "Do YOU AGREE THAT THE BOLIVIAN STATE
SHOULD RECOVER OWNERSHIP OVER ALL HYDROCARBONS
AT THE WELLHEAD?"
There were three articles in the Hydrocarbons Act 1689, of April 30,
1996, that transferred the hydrocarbons' ownership that had already been
extracted to foreign companies. Under article 1.1, the exploitation of hy-
drocarbons was made by means of shared-risk contracts that were signed
between the State and private companies. Article 5 indicated that "the
import, export, and commercialization" of these hydrocarbons was free.
According to article 24, the production obtained by the companies could
be freely disposed. According to Mesa, contracts signed under Hydrocar-
bons Act 1689 would remain in force despite its repeal.
The second question did not explain why contracts signed with the Bo-
livian government would not be nullified. The new Hydrocarbons Act
3058, of May 17, 2005, would maintain the same contracts regime. This
question was interpreted by sectors of the Bolivian population as having
the intent to grant legal security to foreign companies. It would not in
any way harm their interests and would definitely eliminate the shadow
of their disappropriation. The Bolivian Constitution, article 139, clarifies
that the State is the owner of its oil and gas reservoirs in a "direct, ina-
lienable and unprescriptable" way.55 But without the funding to bring
natural gas to surface and to commercialize it, worthless gas reservoirs
would be nationalized.
55. Hydrocarbons Act 3058, art. 5.
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C. QUESTION 3. "Do YOU AGREE THAT [YPFB] SHOULD BE RE-
ESTABLISHED, RECLAIMING STATE OWNERSHIP OF THE BOLIVIAN
PEOPLE'S STAKES IN THE CAPITALIZED OIL COMPANIES, SO THAT IT CAN
TAKE PART IN ALL STAGES OF THE HYDROCARBON
PRODUCTION CHAIN?"
This question was considered fundamental by peasant and labor orga-
nizations, since the State can exert full property rights over hydrocarbons
only through a State-owned company such as YPFB. To Mesa's govern-
ment, the question was not about re-establishing YPFB with the charac-
teristics that it had before its capitalization, i.e., as a State-owned
company that would control hydrocarbons throughout its productive
chain. The government would intend to re-establish YPFB so that it
could operate only through foreign companies, indirectly exerting prop-
erty rights over hydrocarbons by means of shared-risk contracts. YPFB
would not even be included in the transportation and refining process. It
would not be about re-establishing an YPFB that would control hydro-
carbons, taking part in its production and commercialization, but about
restoring an YPFB that would be in charge of signing contracts for the
exploration, exploitation, and commercialization of hydrocarbons with
foreign companies. The goal would be to create an YPFB SAM 56
(Mixed-Economy Public Company) as a shareholder company able to fi-
nance, but that would not take part in the production process.
D. QUESTION 4. "Do YOU AGREE WITH PRESIDENT CARLOS MESA'S
POLICY OF USING GAS AS A STRATEGIC RECOURSE TO
ACHIEVE A SOVEREIGN AND VIABLE ROUTE OF
ACCESS TO THE PACIFIC OCEAN?"
This question could have a double meaning. There would be a vital
need for Bolivia "to achieve a sovereign and viable route of access to the
Pacific Ocean," but how would Bolivia achieve it? The so-called policy of
Carlos Mesa's government "gas for sea" would thereby be clearly de-
fined. The objective would be to obtain a sea strip in the north of Chile,
close to Peru's border, where a Bolivian harbor would be built. In ex-
change, foreign companies would have the right to export Bolivian gas to
the Chilean market under unfavorable conditions for Bolivia.
The loss of access to the Pacific Ocean is a source of lasting national
trauma in Bolivia, but the issue of access to the Pacific Ocean would also
be used to ensure the gas export to Chile. To former president Carlos
Mesa, Chile could not have access to Bolivia's natural gas before solving
the problem of the access to the Pacific Ocean. Gas export, as long as
this problem had not been solved, would be directed towards other coun-
tries. Natural gas would then be used as a strategic resource by the Boliv-
ian foreign policy. This question evoked patriotic feelings in the Bolivian
people by making them think of the "sovereign and viable route of access
56. SAM, in Spanish, stands for "Sociedad An6nima de Economfa Mixta."
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to the Pacific Ocean." 57
E. QUESTION 5: "Do YOU AGREE THAT BOLIVIA SHOULD EXPORT
GAS AS PART OF A NATIONAL POLICY FRAMEWORK THAT ENSURES THE
GAS NEEDS OF BOLIVIANS; ENCOURAGES THE INDUSTRIALIZATION OF
GAS IN THE NATION'S TERRITORY; LEVIES TAXES AND/OR ROYALTIES
OF UP TO 50 PERCENT OF THE PRODUCTION VALUE OF OIL AND GAS ON
OIL COMPANIES, FOR THE NATION'S BENEFIT; AND EARMARKS
REVENUES FROM THE EXPORT AND INDUSTRIALIZATION OF GAS
MAINLY FOR EDUCATION, HEALTH, ROADS, AND JOBS?"
The underlying question was: "Who actually are the entities that should
export gas?" If contracts with foreign companies were not nullified, only
these would export and industrialize Bolivian gas. For foreign compa-
nies, it would be more convenient to export than to industrialize natural
gas. But even if some companies did industrialize gas, its commercializa-
tion would be free, and its production would more probably be directed
towards the foreign market. The whole process would benefit only the
foreign companies. The voter's response to the first part of the question
would confirm his or her response to the previous question, i.e., it ulti-
mately asks the voter if gas is a raw material.
It would still be impossible, for the peasant and labor organizations, to
levy taxes and/or royalties of up to 50 percent of the production value of
oil and gas. The strategy of Mesa's government to reach this goal would
be simple. Royalties of 18 percent should not increase, while the direct
tax on hydrocarbons (DTH)58 would slowly rise year by year until it
reaches 32 percent. This tax rise would be sheer speculation. It had once
been a government-promise, but it had not been fulfilled. The second
part of the question, after ensuring that the gas would meet national de-
mands, would aim the favorable vote of those who would support its in-
dustrialization in Bolivia.
F. EXAMINATION OF THE REFERENDUM'S RESULTS
The referendum's result was clear. On July 18, 2004, 60.06 percent of
the Bolivian voters took part in the referendum. 59 Although voting was
compulsory, the turnout was the lowest since the transition towards de-
mocracy. If the referendum's result had been "no," former President
Carlos Mesa would be obliged to thoroughly change the orientation of its
policy or would be obliged to hold new anticipated elections. The five
questions did receive the necessary votes in order to be considered ap-
57. The issue of Bolivia's geographical seclusion, mediteranneity, is a constant theme
in the Bolivian-Chilean relations, and has been dealt with in international fora
such as the Organization of American States (OAS) and the United Nations (UN).
58. In Spanish, IDH stands for "impuesto directo a los hidrocarburos."
59. Astrid Arrargs & Grace Deheza, Referdndum del Gas en Bolivia 2004: Mucho Mds
Que an Referendum, 25 REVISTA DE CIENCIA POL-TICA (Santiago de Chile) (Issue
2) 167 (2005).
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proved. Questions 1, 2, and 3 received more than 85 percent of favorable
votes. Question 2 received the highest percentage of popular support,
followed by Question 3. Question 1, which had been formulated to con-
trol the referendum's results and to assure its support, reached the third
place in the popular preference. Questions 4 and 5 received the lowest
support levels, but they were not turned down. The "complete recovery"
of hydrocarbons would empower Bolivia with the resources to invest in
education, health, roads, and jobs; this would give means to modernize
the Bolivian State, in all its sectors. The standard of living would rise, and
taxes would go down. Bolivia would be able to grant better living condi-
tions to its inhabitants. There was a redeeming and messianic quality to
the referendum's popularity.
Former president Carlos Mesa then felt authorized to adopt a new hy-
drocarbons act, the Hydrocarbons Act 3058. He interpreted the result as
a demonstration of support for his presidency and his policies. His goal
was to begin by exporting gas to Mexico and the United States through
and with the collaboration of Peru. But what Mesa could not stand
against was the National Congress' resistance to the presidential initia-
tives. Each party had its own interpretation of "complete recovery." For-
mer President Mesa and the Bolivian National Congress confronted for
approval of the executive branch's Hydrocarbons Bill of Law. The con-
flict was mostly circumscribed to tax modifications and/or tax types that
should be adopted to increase the government's share. After various
months of analysis and debate, the Bolivian National Congress approved
Hydrocarbons Act 3058. The law established that a royalty of 18 percent
and a tax of 32 percent was to be collected from foreign companies. 60
Former president Carlos Mesa, despite the approval of Hydrocarbons
Act 3058, did not manage to achieve a consensus on the Bolivian State's
policy as regards oil and gas in relation to the disappropriation of foreign
companies. Segments of the Bolivian society continued to demand an oil
royalty of 50 percent. The interpretation of the results of the referen-
dum's five questions was the most significant factor for the increasing
stress in the relations between Mesa and the National Congress. As a
culminating point in this increasingly frustrating process, Mesa, beset by
an uprising similar to that previously faced by former president Gonzalo
Sdinchez de Lozada, resigned on June 7, 2005, from the presidency of the
Republic.
VI. HYDROCARBONS ACT
Bolivia has already had several hydrocarbons acts throughout its his-
tory. Their content has varied, depending upon political contingencies.
60. "La sumatoria de los ingresos establecidos del 18% por Regafas y del 32% del
Impuesto Directo a los Hidrocarburos (IDH), no serd en ningtn caso menor al
cincuenta por ciento (50%) del valor de la producci6n de los hidrocarburos en
favor del Estado Boliviano, en concordancia con el Articulo 80 de la presente ley."
Hydrocarbons Act 3058, art. 55.3.
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Some have reinforced YPFB's role, the Bolivian oil and gas State-owned
company; others have restricted its mission, foreseeing that, for instance,
it should not industrialize natural gas. YPFB's key function has been op-
erating reservoirs.61 Oil and gas exploration, exploitation, and commer-
cialization have traditionally been in charge of foreign companies. The
popular uprisings that led former presidents Gonzalo Sdnchez de Lozada
and Carlos Mesa to resign have aimed to change this situation. The upris-
ings demanded the nullification of the contracts that had been signed with
foreign companies, and contracts that involved the reservoirs of hydro-
carbons; the uprisings also demanded the strengthening of the YPFB so
that it could competently engage in oil and gas exploration, exploitation,
and commercialization.
Nonetheless, the first article of Hydrocarbons Act 1689, of April 30,
1996, noted, in accordance with the established in the Bolivian Constitu-
tion, article 139, that the State already was the owner of oil and gas reser-
voirs: "Under the Constitution, all hydrocarbons reservoirs, in whatever
condition or form they are found, fall under the "direct, inalienable, and
unrestricted domain" of the State. No concession or contract shall confer
ownership of the hydrocarbons reservoirs. '' 62 YPFB signed concession
contracts with foreign companies for the exploration, exploitation, and
commercialization of hydrocarbons:
The right to explore and exploit hydrocarbon fields and commercial-
ize the products thereof is exercised by the State through YPFB.
This State-owned company shall necessarily sign joint venture con-
tracts of limited duration with individual or legal entities, whether
Bolivian or foreign nationals, for the exploration, exploitation and
commercialization of hydrocarbons in adherence to the provisions of
this law.63
The primordial goal of Hydrocarbons Act 3058, article 2, was "the exe-
cution and enforcement of the July 18th 2004 Referendum's results,
which expresses the Bolivian people's decision." 64 The enforcement of
this goal implied the repeal of Hydrocarbons Act 1689.65 The strategic
character of natural gas for the Bolivian foreign policy was immediately
set forth:
It is recognized the value of natural gas and the rest of hydrocarbons
as a strategic resource, which collaborates with the objectives of so-
cial and economic development for the country and with the Boliv-
ian State's foreign policy, including the achievement of a sovereign
and viable route of access to the Pacific Ocean.66
61. General Hugo Banzer SuArez's government, in the beginning of thel970's, consid-
erably reduced YPFB's field of action, having then also been accused of having
privatized it.
62. CONsTTuciON POL'TICA art. 139.
63. Hydrocarbons Act 1689, art. 1.1.
64. Hydrocarbons Act 3058, art. 2.
65. "Se abroga la Ley de Hidrocarburos N' 1689, de 30 de abril de 1996." Id. art. 3
66. Id. art. 4.
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The "complete recovery" of hydrocarbons was foreseen by Hydrocar-
bons Act 3058, article 5 heading:
Following the Bolivian people's sovereign command, expressed in
the answer to question number two of the July 18th 2004 Binding
Referendum, and in application of article 139 of the State's Political
Constitution, the ownership over all hydrocarbons at the wellhead is
recovered for the Bolivian State. The State shall exercise, through
[YPFB], its ownership right over the totality of hydrocarbons. 67
It has been set up the renegotiation of contracts signed with foreign
companies:
The parties that have signed joint venture contracts to execute the
activities of exploration, exploitation and commercialization, and
have obtained licenses and concessions under the protection of Hy-
drocarbons Act 1689, of April 30, 1996, shall compulsorily convert
themselves to the contract categories set up in the present Act and
adapt themselves to its provisions within the deadline of one hun-
dred and eighty (180) calendar days calculated from its coming into
force. 68
The executive branch has been confirmed as responsible for the policy
of natural gas export and industrialization:
The executive branch, under the economic regime set up in the
State's Political Constitution, shall be responsible for: a) establishing
the policy for the development and opening of markets for gas ex-
port; b) promoting the massive consumption of gas throughout the
national territory in order to improve the Bolivians' life quality,
dynamizing the productive basis, and rising the national economy's
competitiveness; c) developing the policy and the incentives for gas
industrialization in the national territory; d) fomenting the private
sector's participation in gas export and its industrialization. 69
Meeting the demands of the popular uprising that led Gonzalo Sinchez
de Lozada to resign, it has been recognized that the revenues from the
export and industrialization of gas should be earmarked for fighting pov-
erty: "The executive branch shall earmark national revenues from the ex-
port and industrialization of gas mainly in attention for education, health,
roads, and jobs."'70 In order to reach this goal, the foreign companies'
revenue appropriation levels by the Bolivian State actually needed to in-
crease: "It is stipulated that the State shall retain fifty per cent (50%) of
67. Id. art. 5.
Por mandato soberano del pueblo boliviano, expresado en la respuesta a
la pregunta nfimero 2 del Refer6ndum Vinculante de 18 de julio de 2004,
y en aplicaci6n del Articulo 139' de la Constituci6n Polftica del Estado,
se recupera la propiedad de todos los hidrocarburos en Boca de Pozo
para el Estado Boliviano. El Estado ejercerd, a travs de Yacimientos
Petrolfferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB), su derecho propietario sobre la
totalidad de los hidrocarburos.
68. Hydrocarbons Act 3058, art. 5.1 (translated by author).
69. Id. art. 7, heading (translated by author).
70. Id. art. 7, sole paragraph (translated by author).
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the production value of oil and gas, in accordance with the decision con-
tained in the answer to question number 5 of the July 18th 2004 National
Referendum Act."' 71 "The sum of the foreseen revenues of 18% for roy-
alties and of 32% of the Direct Tax on Hydrocarbons (DTH) shall be in
no case lower than fifty per cent (50%) of the production value of hydro-
carbons in favor of the Bolivian State, in accordance with article 8 of the
present Act."'72
The objectives of the hydrocarbons national policy were oriented by an
eminently state-like and sovereign-oriented logic:
The general objectives of the hydrocarbons national policy are as fol-
lows: ... b) to exert control and the effective management, by the
State, of the hydrocarbon activity in protection of its economic and
political sovereignty; ... e) to strengthen, technically and economi-
cally, [YPFB] as the State-owned company in charge of executing the
National Hydrocarbons Policy in order to assure the sovereign use of
the hydrocarbon industry.73
In the same way as Hydrocarbons Act 1689, of April 30, 1996, the Hy-
drocarbons Act 3058, of May 17, 2005, once again in accordance with
what is foreseen in the Bolivian Constitution, has recognized that oil and
gas reservoirs belong to the State:
Hydrocarbons reservoirs, whatever the state in which they are found
or the form in which they are presented, belong to the direct, inalien-
able and unrestricted State's domain. 1. No contract can confer the
ownership over hydrocarbons reservoirs or over hydrocarbons at the
wellhead or up to the fiscalization point. 2. The party to a joint ven-
ture, operation or association contract is obliged to deliver to the
State the totality of the hydrocarbons produced in the contractual
terms that are set up by this.74
Concession contracts have been used as the legal instrument allowing for-
eign companies to assume the exploration, exploitation, and commerciali-
zation of hydrocarbons: "The exploration, exploitation,
commercialization, transportation, storage, refining and industrialization
of hydrocarbons and its derivatives correspond to the State, a right that
shall be exerted by it through autarchic entities or through concessions
and contracts for a limited period by mixed societies or private persons,
in accordance with the law."'75 The Hydrocarbons Ministry is in charge of
defining the prices policy: "The Hydrocarbons Ministry, as regards hydro-
carbons, has the following attributions: ... d) to determine the prices of
hydrocarbons at the fiscalization point for the payment of royalties, retri-
butions and participations, in accordance with the rules set up in the pre-
sent Act."'76
71. Id. art. 8 (translated by author).
72. Id. art. 55.3 (translated by author).
73. Id. art. 11 (translated by author).
74. Id. art. 16 (translated by author).
75. Id. art. 17.1 (translated by author).
76. Id. art. 21 (translated by author).
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Hydrocarbons Act 3058, article 65, has established that the maximum
duration of contracts signed with foreign companies is "forty (40)
years."' 77 The production, once again in accordance with Hydrocarbons
Act 3058, article 66, must be handed over to YPFB, in exchange for the
retribution that is foreseen in the contract. Contracts, always in the light
of Hydrocarbons Act 3058, article 68, must "be authorized and approved,
in accordance with what is set up in article 59.5 of the State's Political
Constitution. 78
VII. CONTRACT BETWEEN PETROBRAS AND YPFB
The contract of buying and selling of natural gas between Petrobras
and YPFB was signed on August 16, 1996. It contains a take or pay
clause,79 determining that Petrobras shall need to pay for the negotiated
natural gas, even if it was not consumed. The contract sets up the selling
volume, the volume measurement system, how the prices shall be ad-
justed and to whom the gas shall be delivered. Subclause 20.1 of the con-
tract provides for a duration of twenty years, counted "from the supply
beginning, pending on the Parties' agreement to be extended." The Con-
sideranda in the contract refers to the instrument signed by Brazil and
Bolivia that gave occasion to the contract's signing:
On November 26, 1991, in the city of La Paz, a Letter of Intentions
on the Energetic Integration Process between Bolivia and Brazil, by
Petrobras, YPFB and the Ministry of Energy and Hydrocarbon of
the Republic of Bolivia was signed. ... YPFB on its turn decided to
reach an agreement with Petrobras in order to supply with natural
gas the Brazilian market and to adopt the necessary measures to as-
sure the availability of the previously cited volumes.
The buying and selling of gas was considered a fundamental factor in
the integration between Bolivia and Brazil:
That the Ministry of Mining and Energy of the Federative Republic
of Brazil and the Ministry of Energy and Hydrocarbons of the Re-
public of Bolivia, gathered from May 25 to May 26, 1992, in the city
of Brasilia, declared that the buying-selling of Natural Gas is a piv-
otal political decision to the integration process between Brazil and
Bolivia and for the economic growth of both countries.
According to subclause 2.1, the contract's objective was the purchase of
natural gas by Petrobras from YPFB for "a duration of twenty years cal-
culated from the Supply Beginning, what can be extended by the parties'
agreement" One of the goals of constructing the gas pipeline, under sub-
clause 3.6, was to supply Brazil's South and Southeast Region, mostly the
State of Sdo Paulo. The contract provided for a meticulous price adjust-
77. Id. art. 65 (translated by author).
78. Id. art. 68 (translated by author).
79. Briefly, a "take or pay clause" is a minimum consumption and transportation
clause. Contract Between Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB)
and Petr6leo Brasileiro S.A. (Petrobras) (Aug. 16, 1996) (on file with author).
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ment system. Subclause 11.1 states: "The price of Gas, in US$/MMBtu, in
Rio Grande, Bolivia, for each Year, in the gas pipeline's entrance point, is
what is included in the following chart, price that henceforth will be
called P(i), being (i) the contractual year of reference." Also, subclause
15.1 allows parties to review contractual clauses by requesting for review:
Without interrupting nor suspending the deadlines fixed for the ful-
fillment of the Party's obligations, it is reserved the Parties' right to
mutually request meetings, which shall not be refused to discuss any
Clause of commercialization, economic and technical nature, in case
of occurrence of subsequent changes, including those motivated by
the evolution of the international energy market prices, that may af-
fect the basis on which such Clauses have been agreed and that harm
any of the Parties.
Subclauses 17.1 and 17.2 indicate that the dispute solution process in-
cludes the recourse to arbitration:
Subclause 17.1: Any dispute, controversy or complaint that is elicited
by or in relation to the Contract between the Parties shall be solved
initially by discussion, consultation and negotiation between the
Parties.
Subclause 17.2: All disputes, controversies and complaints that could
be elicited from the interpretation or fulfillment of any of the Con-
tract's Clauses and that have not been solved by the Parties in accor-
dance with what is set up in Subclause 17.1 of the present Clause,
within a deadline of sixty (60) days, shall be exclusively submitted to
the American Arbitration Association of New York, being applied
its Regulation on International Arbitration.
Furthermore, subclause 17.5 makes the result of arbitration binding:
"The arbitrators' majority decision shall be presented in writing and shall
be binding and unappealable."
VIII. SUPREME DECREE
On May 1, 2006, President Evo Morales, after 100 days in government,
enacted the Supreme Decree 28701, announcing the "complete recovery"
of oil and gas.80 The decree contains, right in its beginning, an evocation
to the "heroes of Chaco. ' ' 81 In the Chaco War, fought from 1932 to 1935,
Bolivia, as we have already highlighted before, lost to Paraguay a vast
territory where supposedly there was oil.
The Consideranda explicitly connect the "complete recovery" of oil
and gas to the popular uprisings that led former presidents Gonzalo
Sinchez de Lozada and Carlos Mesa to resign: "In historic struggles, the
people have paid with their blood for the right to have our hydrocarbon
riches returned to the hands of the Nation. '82 Supreme Decree 28701
80. In Bolivian law, a supreme decree is a law approved by the President of the Re-
public based on his regulatory and administrative competence.
81. Supreme Decree 28701, "HWroes del Chaco."
82. Id., Consideranda.
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was adopted as an answer to the July 18, 2004 Referendum, when the
electorate would have decided in favor of the "complete recovery" of
hydrocarbons. The referendum did not contemplate, nonetheless, any
question regarding the disappropriation of foreign companies. There was
a question on the ownership of hydrocarbons at the wellhead. In the ref-
erendum, the electorate did not vote either for the ownership, possession,
and absolute and total control over these resources. In the light of the
Bolivian Constitution, articles 136, 137, and 139, oil and gas belong to the
State in a "direct, inalienable, and unrestricted" way. They constitute an
inviolable public property. The "complete recovery" of oil and gas would
then need to entail the disappropriation of foreign companies, based on
the ground that the contracts that had been signed with them could be
nullified for lack of form requirements. They would not have been au-
thorized and approved by the legislative branch, a requirement that is
stipulated by the Bolivian Constitution, article 59.5. The language
adopted by the Supreme Decree 28701 is categorical: "The so-called pro-
cess of capitalization and privatization of YPFB has not only caused
grave economic harm to the State, but is also an act of treason against the
country for placing the control and management of a strategic sector in
foreign hands, violating national sovereignty and dignity. '83
The complete recovery of oil and gas is announced as the primordial
objective to be reached: "The State reclaims total and absolute owner-
ship, possession and control of these resources. '8 4 "Beginning May 1,
2006, the oil companies currently carrying out gas and petroleum produc-
tion activities in the national territory are required to deliver ownership
of all hydrocarbons production to YPFB. ''85 "YPFB, in the name and
representation of the State, in full exercise of its ownership over all hy-
drocarbons produced in the country, will take over their commercializa-
tion, defining the conditions, volumes and prices for export and
industrialization as well as for the domestic market. '86 Hydrocarbons
Act 3058, of May 17, 2005, then in force, did not allow the State to unilat-
erally fix export prices for natural gas. The Act was therefore modified
by means of a decree, which is unconstitutional:
Only the companies which immediately abide by the provisions of
the present Supreme Decree will be able to continue operating in the
country until, in a period of not greater than 180 days from its enact-
ment, their activity is regularized through contracts which comply
with legal and constitutional terms and requirements. At the end of
this period, companies which have not signed contracts will not be
able to continue operating in the country.87
Further ahead, the decree states:
83. Id.
84. Id. art. 1.1.
85. Id. art. 2.1.
86. Id. art. 2.2.
87. Id. art. 3.1.
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During the transition period, for those fields whose average certified
production of natural gas for the year 2005 was higher than 100 mil-
lion cubic feet daily, the value of the production will be distributed in
the following manner: 82% for the State (18% in royalties and par-
ticipation, 32% in Direct Tax on Hydrocarbons - DTH, and 32%
through an additional participation for YPFB), and 18% for the
companies (which covers operational expenses, amortization of in-
vestments and profits). 88
Only the fields of San Alberto and San Antonio, then operated by Pe-
trobras, fell within the daily production average, "higher than 100 million
cubic feet daily." 89 These fields were responsible for around half of the
gas volume imported by Brazil. Article 4.1 was written having Petrobras
as its goal. The 82 percent was meant to be applied only during the tran-
sition period of 180 days. This increase in the government take reduced
the profitability of Petrobras, which became negative. This provision
contradicts what had been approved in the Referendum and what was
mandated by the Hydrocarbons Act 3058, of May 17, 2005. The Referen-
dum and the Hydrocarbons Act 3058 reduced the government take to no
more than 50 percent. Once again, a decree revokes what is mandated by
an act.
Foreign companies became sheer production operators and would re-
ceive 18 percent from YPFB as remuneration. The "complete recovery"
of oil and gas should happen in the framework of audits that would define
the government take, the appropriation by the State of part of the reve-
nue that is earned by foreign companies with the exploration, exploita-
tion, and commercialization of hydrocarbons, but not the indemnification
due in case of disappopriation:
The Ministry of Hydrocarbons and Energy will use audits to deter-
mine, case by case, the investments made by the companies as well as
their amortizations, operational expenses and profitability obtained
in each field. The results of the audits will serve as benchmarks for
YPFB to determine the final payments or participation due to the
companies on the contracts to be signed according to Article 3 of the
present Supreme Decree.90
Foreign companies would be able to continue operating in Bolivia, as
long as they adjust themselves to the new government take levels, to be
defined by means of audit reports.
The Bolivian State then began to lead with exclusivity the exploration,
exploitation and commercialization of hydrocarbons: "The State will take
control of the management of production, transportation, refining, stor-
age, distribution, commercialization and industrialization of the country's
88. Id. art. 4.1.
89. INT'L CRISIS GROUP, LATIN AMERICA REPORT No. 18: BOLIVIA'S ROCKY ROAD
TO REFORMS, July 3, 2006, at 7 n.59, available at http://www.conflictprevention.net/
library/documents/latin-america/-bolivia-s-rocky-road-to-reforms-cpp.pdf.
90. Id. art. 4.3.
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hydrocarbons. "91
"The State recovers its full participation in the entire chain of produc-
Lion of the hydrocarbon sector."' 92 In order to ensure the means for the
State to accomplish this mission, the nationalization of foreign companies
was announced without indemnification, what can be considered as a
kind of expropriation: "The necessary stocks are nationalized so that
YPFB controls at a minimum 50% plus one in the companies Chaco
S.A.,93 Andina S.A.,94 Transredes S.A.,95 Petrobras Bolivia Refinaci6n
S.A. and Compafifa Logfstica de Hidrocarburos de Bolivia S.A."'96 Pe-
trobras Bolivia Refinaci6n S.A. operated two refineries in Bolivia, one in
Santa Cruz de la Sierra and another in Cochabamba. They were the
country's most important refineries and were handed over to the control
of the local State-owned company: "YPFB will immediately appoint its
representatives and trustees to the respective boards of directors and will
sign new partnership and management contracts in which the State's con-
trol and governance of hydrocarbon activities in the country are guaran-
teed. '97 The "complete recovery" of oil and gas did not comprise the
nationalization of oil and gas reservoirs, which had not been denational-
ized. Foreign companies had obtained in international public biddings
concessions that allowed them to be involved in the exploration, exploita-
tion and commercialization of hydrocarbons, but none of them had the
ownership over oil and gas reservoirs.
IX. AGREEMENT ON ENCOURAGEMENT AND RECIPROCAL
PROTECTION OF INVESTMENTS
Petrobras Bolivia, signatory to the contract with YPFB, is controlled by
a Petrobras subsidiary whose headquarters are located in the Nether-
lands. It was not Petrobras/Brazil, but instead Petrobras/Netherlands
that made the investments in Bolivia. The Netherlands signed a bilateral
investments treaty with Bolivia, the Agreement on Encouragement and
Reciprocal Protection of Investments between the Kingdom of the
Netherlands and the Republic of Bolivia. Bilateral investments treaties
have as goal the protection of foreign investments. They not only contain
rules that protect the invested assets, but they also foresee mechanisms to
solve disputes between a country member and investors of another coun-
try member. The Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protec-
tion of Investments between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the
91. Id. art. 5.1.
92. Id. art. 7.1.
93. Chaco S.A. is controlled by British Petroleum.
94. Andina S.A. is a subsidiary of the Spanish Repsol.
95. Transredes S.A. is connected to the Anglo-Dutch Shell and to the American
Enron.
96. Compafifa Logfstica de Hidrocarburos de Bolivia S.A. is controlled by the German
Oiltanking GmbH; Decreto Supremo, art. 7.2.
97. Decreto Supremo, art. 7.3.
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Republic of Bolivia could have been used to defend the interests of Pe-
trobras in case of disappropriation.
Under the Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection
of Investments between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Repub-
lic of Bolivia, the protection of foreign investments helps "to strengthen
the traditional ties of friendship" and "to extend and intensify the eco-
nomic relations" between the Netherlands and Bolivia.98 Both the
Netherlands and Bolivia have recognized that the "agreement upon the
treatment to be accorded to such investments will stimulate the flow of
capital and technology and the economic development of the Contracting
Parties and that fair and equitable treatment of investment is
desirable. "99
In the light of the Agreement, article 1, the broadest possible interpre-
tation should be given to "investments":
For the purposes of the present Agreement: (a) the term 'invest-
ments' shall comprise every kind of asset and more particularly,
though not exclusively: i. movable and immovable property as well
as any other rights in rem in respect of every kind of asset; ii. rights
derived from shares, bonds and other kinds of interests in companies
and joint ventures; iii. title to money, goodwill and other assets and
to any performance having an economic value; iv. rights in the field
of intellectual property, technical processes and know-how; v. rights
granted under public law, including rights to prospect, explore, ex-
tract and exploit natural resources. 100
Article 1 also defines the parameters according to which a company may
be considered a national to one of the contracting parties:
For the purposes of the present Agreement: ... (b) the term 'nation-
als' shall comprise with regard to either Contracting Party: i. natural
persons having the nationality of that Contracting Party in accor-
dance with its law; ii. without prejudice to the provisions of (iii) here-
after, legal persons constituted in accordance with the law of that
Contracting Party; iii. legal persons controlled directly or indirectly,
by nationals of that Contracting Party, but constituted in accordance
with the law of the other Contracting Party.101
The "fair and equitable treatment" and the "full security and protec-
tion" of foreign investments are the key guidelines of the Agreement on
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments between the
Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Bolivia:
1) Each Contracting Party shall ensure fair and equitable treatment
to the investments of nationals of the other Contracting Party and
98. Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments Between




100. Id. art. L.a.
101. Id. art. 1.b.
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shall not impair, by unreasonable or discriminatory measures, the
operation, management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal
thereof by those nationals. 2) More particularly, each Contracting
Party shall accord to such investments full security and protection
which in any case shall not be less than that accorded either to in-
vestments of its own nationals or to investments of nationals of any
third State, whichever is more favorable to the investor. 10 2
Disappropriation entails the payment of an indemnification:
Neither Contracting Party shall take any measures depriving, directly
or indirectly, nationals of the other Contracting Party of their invest-
ments unless the following conditions are complied with: (a) the
measures are taken in the public interest and under due process of
law; (b) the measures are not discriminatory or contrary to any un-
dertaking which the former Contracting Party may have given; (c)
the measures are accompanied by provision for the payment of just
compensation. Such compensation shall represent the genuine value
of the investments affected and shall, in order to be effective for the
claimants, be paid and made transferable, without undue delay, to
the country designated by the claimants concerned and in the cur-
rency of the country of which the claimants are nationals or in any
freely convertible currency accepted by the claimants. 10 3
If disputes arise, the contracting parties should primarily have recourse
to consultation:
1) For the purpose of resolving disputes that may arise from invest-
ments between one Contracting Party and a national of the other
Party to the present Agreement, consultation will be held with a
view to settling, amicably the conflict between the parties to the
dispute.
2) If a dispute cannot be settled within a period of six months from
the date on which the interested national shall have formally notified
it, the dispute shall, at the request of the interested national, be sub-
mitted to an arbitral tribunal.
3) The arbitral tribunal shall be constituted ad hoc, in such a way
that each party shall nominate an arbitrator, and the arbitrators shall
agree on the choice of a national of a third State as chairman of the
tribunal. The arbitrators shall be nominated within a period of two
months, and the chairman within a period of three months, from the
time the interested national shall have communicated his wish to
submit the dispute to an arbitral tribunal.
4) If the time limits provided for in paragraph three are not ob-
served, either of the parties to the dispute shall, if no other provi-
sions apply between the parties to the dispute, be empowered to
request the President of the Court of Arbitration of the Paris Inter-
national Chamber of Commerce to proceed to make the necessary
appointments.
102. Id. art. 3.
103. Id. art. 6.
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5) Paragraphs 4 to 7 of Section 13 of the present Agreement shall
apply mutatis mutandis. 10 4
The Agreement also explicitly sets forth the recourse to the Interna-
tional Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), which
is an autonomous international organization created by the Convention
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals
of other States, which came into force on October 14, 1966:
If both Contracting Parties have acceded to the Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of
other States of 18 March 1965, any disputes that may arise from in-
vestment between one of the Contracting Parties and a national of
the other Contracting Party shall, in accordance with the provisions
of that Convention, be submitted for conciliation or arbitration to
the international Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes.105
ICSID aims at facilitating the solution of disputes involving govern-
ments and foreign investors through conciliation and arbitration. By the
time of the so-called "nationalization process", Bolivia and the Nether-
lands were members to the ICSID.10 6 "The provisions of this Agreement
shall, from the date of entry into force thereof, also apply to investments,
which have been made before that date. ' 107
The Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of In-
vestments between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of
Bolivia, article 13.1, also sets up procedures for arbitration:
Any dispute between the Contracting Parties concerning the inter-
pretation or application of the present Agreement which cannot be
settled, within a reasonable lapse of time, by means of diplomatic
negotiations, shall, unless the Parties have otherwise agreed, be sub-
mitted, at the request of either Party, to an arbitral tribunal, com-
posed of three members. Each Party shall appoint one arbitrator
and the two arbitrators thus appointed shall together appoint a third
arbitrator as their chairman who is not a national of either Party.10 8
"If one of the Parties fails to appoint its arbitrator and has not proceeded
to do so within two months after an invitation from the other Party to
make such appointment, the latter Party may invite the President of the
International Court of Justice to make the necessary appointment.' 0 9
"If the two arbitrators are unable to reach agreement, in the two months
following their appointment, on the choice of the third arbitrator, either
Party may invite the President of the International Court of Justice, to
104. Id. art. 9.
105. Id. art. 9.6.
106. See ICSID Members of the Panels of Conciliators and of Arbitrators, World Bank,
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/pubs/icsid-10/icsid-10.htm (last visited Apr. 23,
2007).
107. Agreement, art. 10.
108. Id. art. 13.1.
109. Id. art. 13.2.
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make the necessary appointment."110
If, in the cases provided for in the second and third paragraph of this
Section, the President of the International Court of Justice is pre-
vented from discharging the said function or is a national of either
Contracting Party, the Vice-President shall be invited to make the
necessary appointments. If the Vice-President is prevented from dis-
charging the said function or is a national of either Party the most
senior member of the Court available who is not a national of either
Party shall be invited to make the necessary appointments.111
The tribunal shall decide on the basis of respect for the law, including
in particular the present Agreement and any other relevant agree-
ment between the Contracting Parties as well as the generally recog-
nized rules and principles of International Law. Before the tribunal
decides, it may at any stage of the proceedings propose to the Parties
that the dispute be settled amicably. The foregoing provisions shall
not prejudice the power of the tribunal to decide the dispute ex ae-
quo et bono if the Parties so agree. 112
The Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Invest-
ments between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Bo-
livia, article 13.6, also states: "Unless the Parties decide otherwise, the
tribunal shall determine its own procedure.11 3 "The tribunal shall reach
its decision by a majority of votes. Such decision shall be final and bind-
ing on the Parties.' ' 14
X. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
The international responsibility of the State has immediate and direct
consequences to the companies that are established abroad. It is not nec-
essarily connected to the breach of international treaties. In the
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case, the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice said:
It is an elementary principle of international law that a state is enti-
tled to protect its subjects, when injured by acts contrary to interna-
tional law committed by another state, from whom they have been
unable to obtain satisfaction through the ordinary channels. By tak-
ing up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic
action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a state is in
reality asserting its own rights - its rights to ensure, in the person of
110. Id. art. 13.3.
111. Id. art. 13.4.
112. Id. art. 13.5.
113. Id. art. 13.6.
114. During the so-called "nationalization process," Bolivia withdrew from ICSID and
announced its intention to revise its bilateral investment treaties. Bilaterals.org,
Bolivia Notifies World Bank of Withdrawal from ICSID, Pursues BIT Revisions,
http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id-article=8221 (last visited Sept. 27, 2007);
Agreement, art. 13.7.
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its subjects, respect for the rules of international law. 115
Several diplomatic disputes regarding companies that operate abroad
have already arisen based on many grounds. If a company is hit abroad
in a way that there is a violation to international law, it must contact the
respective Department of Foreign Affairs. Whether or not the govern-
ment of its country of origin will defend this company, it will depend
upon this country's interests and political conveniences. Under the stand-
point of international law, the company that regards itself as having been
hit has no right to compel the government of its country of origin to file
an international claim on its behalf. The filing of an international claim
may be a motivation for the involved States to reach an agreement
through diplomatic negotiation. The state that hits the company that op-
erates abroad may admit responsibility and pay indemnification.
The company must certify its nationality as national to the claiming
state and exhaust the local remedies available in the state that shall be
held accountable for the internationally illegal conduct. The company's
nationality usually depends upon its corporate headquarters and what is
foreseen by the legal system of the state where it is organized. The local
remedies of the responding state must be actually available; they must be
feasible. It is not necessary to exhaust these local remedies if they are not
feasible, nor if it is not relevant to have access to them: "There can be no
need to resort to the municipal courts if those courts have no jurisdiction
to afford relief; nor is it necessary again to resort to those courts if the
result must be a repetition of a decision already given."116 Bolivian
courts would unlikely contradict what is set forth in the Supreme Decree
28701, of May 1, 2006. If Brazil had intended to file an international
claim on the behalf of Petrobras requiring indemnification for its disap-
propriation, the State should not have demanded that Petrobras had ex-
hausted Bolivia's local remedies.
For a state to be held responsible for the payment of an indemnifica-
tion, its international responsibility must have been acknowledged in a
concrete case. Rules of international law, and not of national law, must
have been broken. There must be an illegal conduct under an interna-
tional standpoint. When a contract between a foreign company and a
state is nullified or violated, would it be possible to acknowledge the in-
ternational responsibility of the latter? If this contract's framework was
the national law, would there be a violation to the international law
rules? The answer to these questions is in the affirmative. If the contract
is arbitrarily nullified or violated, if the assets of the foreign company
were confiscated, the responsibility of the state may be acknowledged
based on the violation of international law rules.
115. The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case (Greece v. U.K.), 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser.
B) No. 3, at 12 (Aug. 30).
116. The Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway Case (Est. V. Lith.), 1939 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A/B)
No. 76, at 18 (Feb. 28).
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If a foreign company suffers disappropriation, its facilities must be sub-
ject to indemnification. For instance, the Selwyn case, from the Arbitral
Tribunal, describes the following:
The act of the Government may have proceeded from the highest
reasons of public policy and with the largest regard for the state and
its interests; but when from the necessity or policy of the Govern-
ment it appropriates or destroys the property or property rights of an
alien it is held to make full and adequate compensation therefore. 117
The same point of view was adopted by the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal in
the Goldenberg case: "If international law authorizes a State for motives
of public utility, to derogate from the principle of respect for the private
property of aliens, it is on the condition sine qua non that the expropri-
ated or requisitioned property will be paid for fairly as quickly as possi-
ble." 118 The disappropriation of a foreign company is legal if a "full and
adequate" indemnification is paid.
Resolution 1803 (XVII) of the United Nations General Assembly, of
December 14, 1962, called "Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Re-
sources" recognizes the right of every State to dispose of its natural re-
sources according to its interests with the goal of strengthening its
economic independence. It is possible to authorize, to limit or to forbid
the activities of foreign companies interested in the exploitation of such
resources. 119 In case of nationalization or disappropriation of a foreign
company, even if it is based on public utility, the State must anyway pay
an indemnification:
Nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on
grounds or reasons of public utility, security or the national interest
which are recognized as overriding purely individual or private inter-
ests, both domestic and foreign. In such cases the owner shall be
paid appropriate compensation, in accordance with the rules in force
in the State taking such measures in the exercise of its sovereignty
and in accordance with international law. In any case where the
question of compensation gives rise to a controversy, the national
jurisdiction of the State taking such measures shall be exhausted.
However, upon agreement by sovereign States and other parties con-
cerned, settlement of the dispute should be made through arbitration
or international adjudication.1 20
117. William W. Bishop Jr., General Course of Public International Law, in 115 [1965-
III RECUEIL DES COURS: COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 405 (Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff, ed. 1965) (discussing the Selwyn
Case of 1903).
118. Id. at 405-06 (discussing the Goldenberg Case of 1928 from the Mixed Arbitral
Tribunal).
119. G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), Annex, § 2, U.N. Doc. AIRes/1803 (XVII)/Annex (Dec.
14, 1962). "The exploration, development and disposition of such resources, as
well as the import of the foreign capital required for these purposes, should be in
conformity with the rules and conditions which the peoples and nations freely con-
sider to be necessary or desirable with regard to the authorization, restriction or
prohibition of such activities." Id.
120. Id. § 4.
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XI. CONCLUSION
As we discussed in this article, Bolivia was the first South American
country to nationalize its hydrocarbon resources, in 1937, a measure that
was adopted again in 1969. Now, we would be facing the third and defini-
tive nationalization of oil and gas. There is not, nonetheless, a new na-
tionalization, in the strict sense, but, as we have the opportunity to
demonstrate, a disappropriation of foreign companies. For a long time,
the Bolivian Constitution has made sure that oil and gas reservoirs belong
to the State.
The disappropriation of foreign companies in Bolivia has violated con-
tracts signed in the light of the Bolivian law then in force. The State took
over the shares control of Petrobras Bolivia Refinaci6n S.A. YPFB, rep-
resenting the Bolivian State, took over the commercialization of hydro-
carbons, defining the conditions, volumes and prices of their
industrialization and export. The rise in the government take from 50
percent to 82 percent rendered unviable Petrobras operations in Bolivia.
This increase would be temporary, but 50 percent would already be a
confiscation. Companies that did not agree with the "complete recovery"
of oil and gas had only 180 days to revise the contracts from the enacting
of Supreme Decree 28701, of May 1, 2006. Petrobras was the most hit
foreign company, since it had the broadest presence in Bolivia. The
"complete recovery" of oil and gas was announced by the president Evo
Morales in the field of San Alberto, the most important in Bolivia, then
operated by Petrobras.
In the dispute involving the disappropriation of Petrobras facilities in
Bolivia, the best choice was a friendly solution between the parties. The
recourse to the Bolivian judicial branch was thought about. The Bolivian
judicial branch, notwithstanding, would have trouble in contradicting the
guidelines set up by the executive branch of that country. The recourse
to arbitration, according to the procedures and rules of the American Ar-
bitration Association (AAA), in order to fix the controversies around the
price of gas, was also cogitated. If no agreement had been reached in the
framework of the original contract, the right to recover Petrobras invest-
ments through the application of the Agreement on Encouragement and
Reciprocal Protection of Investments between the Kingdom of the
Netherlands and the Republic of Bolivia could have been a choice. This
agreement sets forth the possibility of recourse to the International
Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). The best pos-
sible choice to this conflict was precisely, nonetheless, to avoid, by means
of diplomatic and political negotiations, a scenario that would justify the
search for an unfriendly solution.
